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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the Court 
of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Because Flanders is dissatisfied with the Radmans' Statement of Issues, it presents 
the following statement of the issues presented on appeal and on cross-appeal: 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of the Radman's prior 
statements and representations regarding the electric melters? The issue of "whether 
evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for correctness, 
incorporating a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review for subsidiary factual 
determinations.'5 State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 878 
P.2d 1154 (1994) (citations omitted). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the Section 3(h) warranty of 
"good operating condition" and the Section 2(h) warranty of "no material 
misstatements"? A trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question 
of law and the "district court's interpretation is granted no deference." Grynberg v. 
Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, [^56, 70 P.3d 1. 
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Issue 3: Did the trial court err in awarding damages for breach of the good 
operating condition warranty based on the value of the asset that did not conform to that 
warranty? Whether the trial court applied the correct rule for measuring damages is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 
2004 UT 59,^25, 96 P.3d 893. 
Issue 4: Did the trial court err in its finding of the value of the electric melters as 
warranted? The amount of damages awarded by a trial court is a factual determination 
that is reviewed for clear error. See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, 
f25, 96 P.3d 893; Hogle v. Zinetics Med.y Inc., 2002 UT 121, flO, 63 P.3d 80; Lysenko v. 
Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, ^ |15, 7 P.3d 783; Wasatch Bank v. Leany, 727 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 
1986). 
Issue 5: Did the trial court err in its finding of the actual value of the electric 
melters? The amount of damages awarded by a trial court is a factual determination that 
is reviewed for clear error. See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ^|25, 96 
P.3d 893; Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 121, If 10, 63 P.3d S0;Lysenko v. Sawaya, 
2000 UT 58, f 15, 7 P.3d 783; Wasatch Bank v. Leany, 727 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1986). 
Issue 6: Did the trial court err in ruling that Flanders' award had to be offset 
against the Radmans' award prior to computing prejudgment interest? The trial court's 
decision to deny prejudgment interest is a question of law reviewed for correctness, 
however the trial court's subsidiary factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ^28, 133 P.3d 428. 
190147 4 DOC 0 
Issue 7: Did the trial court create an "atmosphere of prejudice" to the Radmans? 
Flanders is not entirely sure what this issue alleges, or the correct standard of review for 
this amalgam of conclusory assertions regarding evidentiary and procedural error, but the 
underlying assertions of error are likely reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Lee v. 
Langley, 2005 UT App 339, \% 121 P.3d 33. 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Issue 8: Did the trial court err in determining that Section 9 of the Merger 
Agreement was ambiguous? Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See Peterson v. The 
Sunrider Corporation, 2002 UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918. This issue was preserved by 
Flanders' motion for summary judgment argued the first day of trial. [R. 4939 p. 13.] 
Issue 9: Did the trial court err in interpreting Section 9 of the Merger Agreement 
by specifying a result rather than clarifying the actual language of the contract? A trial 
court's interpretation of an ambiguous contract is reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See Wade v. Stangl 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, whether a rule 
of uniform application was properly applied is a legal question reviewed for correctness. 
See Lysenko v. Saw ay a, 2000 UT 58, \ 17, 7 P.3d 783. This issue was preserved at R. 
4940 pp. 370-71 and R. 4766. 
Issue 10: Did the trial court err in determining that there could be more than one 
prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees? A trial court's determination 
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as to who was the prevailing party is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, f7, 128 P.3d 63. However, an attorney fee 
decision that involves a question of law is reviewed for correctness, see AX. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, ]f6, 94 P.3d 270, and a trial court's 
interpretation of binding case law is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
See Christiansen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2005 UT 21, [^7, 116 P.3d 259. This 
issue was preserved at R. 4949 pp. 29-30. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No such provisions apply to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Flanders and the Radmans entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the 
"Merger AgreementM) dated as of November 1, 1997. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, 
Flanders exchanged some of its restricted capital stock for all of the stock of G.F.I., Inc. 
The Merger Agreement contained, among other things, a limited market protection 
provision and several warranties as to GFFs equipment. After the closing of the Merger 
Agreement, Flanders discovered that the GFI equipment did not operate as warranted, 
and spent considerable time and money in attempting to bring the equipment up to 
standard. Also after the Merger, the market value of the Flanders restricted stock 
dropped, and the Radmans requested that Flanders fulfill its obligations under the limited 
market protection provision. Flanders issued additional shares to the Radmans, which the 
190147 4 DOC A 
Radmans contended were insufficient under the Merger Agreement. The Radmans filed 
a Complaint [R. 1-7], and Flanders counterclaimed. [R. 13-28.] 
This matter came before the trial court for a nine-day bench trial beginning on 
May 3-4, 2004, continuing on October 12-14, 2004, and continuing, again, to July 19-22, 
2005. Thereafter, the parties submitted further briefing on certain limited issues. On 
October 6, 2005, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision. [R. 4287-4298.] After 
considering several post-trial motions, the trial court entered a second Memorandum 
Decision dated February 10, 2006. [R. 4673-4679.] The trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were entered on April 17, 2006 [R. 4857-4894], and a Final Judgment 
was entered on June 27, 2006. [R. 4921-4922.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In or about 1990, the Radmans acquired from bankruptcy the assets of a Salt Lake 
City fiberglass manufacturing company known as Glass Fiber Industries. [R. 4859.] The 
Radmans organized a new entity to hold the assets known as G.F.I., Inc., ("GFI"), owned 
entirely by the Radmans, and began operating GFFs fiberglass manufacturing plant. [R. 
4859.] GFI manufactured Modigliani fiberglass that was used as a filter media for certain 
air filter products and used some of the fiberglass that it manufactured to produce its own 
air filters. [R. 4859.] GFFs gross yearly sales at the time of its merger with Flanders was 
around $1 million. [R. 4942 p. 146.] 
Sometime in 1997, GFI employee Rodney Smith approached Flanders about 
acquiring GFI. [R. 4861.] In late 1997, Steven Clark, on behalf of Flanders, and Ivan 
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Radman, on behalf of GFI, discussed the possible sale of GFI to Flanders. [R. 4861.] 
Mr. Radman and Mr. Clark proceeded to negotiate ihe terms of the transaction. [R. 
4861.] Both parties were represented by counsel in documenting and finalizing the terms 
of the agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement"), which the Radmans and 
Flanders signed in or about November 1997. [R. 4862.] The transaction closed on 
November 26, 1997, and Flanders took over the operation, including most of the 
employees, on that same date. [Ex. P-l, Section 6.] 
The Market Protection Clause 
The price and terms of the deal changed over the course of negotiations. Flanders 
initially offered the Radmans $600,000 in cash for the stock of the GFI. [R. 4940 pp. 
280, 191.] The Radmans instead wanted $1.5 million, and the parties agreed to structure 
the sale as an exchange of Flanders stock for GFFs stock. [R. 4861-62, 4868.] The 
Radmans benefited from this structure because it provided tax advantages to them, and 
because it gave them the opportunity to increase what they received from the transaction 
if Flanders5 stock price increased. [R. 4868-69.] Eventually, Flanders agreed to exchange 
187,502 shares of Flanders stock, which the Agreement expressly valued at $8.00 per 
share for an aggregate market price of $1,500,016. [Ex. P-L] 
Because these shares of Flanders stock were restricted, the agreement contained a 
limited market protection clause. [Ex. P-l, Section 9.] Flanders counsel and counsel for 
the Radmans had a significant dispute over the form of the market protection clause, but 
Flanders' counsel was unwilling to make the additional changes requested by counsel for 
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the Radmans. [R. 4862-63.] During the course of negotiations, and at Ivan Radman's 
request, the Radmans' counsel provided a copy of a market protection provision used by 
the Radmans in the prior sale of an insulation plant owned by the Radmans and sold to 
Owens Corning for stock valued at $50 million at the time of the transaction. [R. 4939 p. 
137.] According to Ivan Radman, that provision acted as a guarantee of the cash value of 
a sales price for the Owens Corning transaction, although Mr. Radman personally 
allowed that guarantee to lapse in hopes that Owens Corning shares would increase in 
value. [R. 4939 p. 115, 137.] The Radmans' counsel conceded under cross examination 
that the terms of the Merger Agreement did not provide the guarantee of $1.5 million 
sought by the Radmans. [R. 4940 p. 239.] Section 9 of the Merger Agreement (the 
"Market Protection Clause") reads as follows: 
Pursuant to this Agreement, the GFI Shareholders are receiving 187,502 
shares of Flanders Capital Stock as set forth on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
Since the 187,502 shares of Flanders Capital Stock are restricted shares, 
each share has a discounted market value of $8.00 per share, for an 
aggregate market price of $1,500,016 (the "Market Price"). If at the time 
any of the GFI Shareholders sell any of the 187,502 shares of Flanders 
Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average trading 
price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital Stock as 
listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is below $8.00 per share, Flanders 
shall deliver additional restricted shares of Flanders Common Stock to such 
GFI Shareholders in order to maintain the Market Price (the "Short Fall"), 
with such Short Fall shares valued at the Market Price. 
[Ex. P-l, Section 9 (emphasis added).] The Merger Agreement Closed on November 26, 
1997, at which time GFI, Inc. was merged into Flanders Acquisitions, Inc., a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Flanders Corporation. Flanders Acquisitions, Inc. was subsequently 
renamed PrecisionAire of Utah, Inc. [Ex. P-l; R. 4939 p. 278.] Ivan Radman and the 
190147 4 DOC 7 
other Radman parties signed the Agreement as shareholders, and Ivan Radman also 
signed the Agreement as President of GFI. [Ex P-l, R. 4939 p. 140.] 
As contemplated by paragraph 9(a) of the Agreement, Flanders issued 187,502 
shares of restricted Flanders stock to the Radmans, which they divided among themselves 
according to their respective interest in GFI. [R. 4870; R. 4939 p. 143; Ex. P-l, Exhibit 
A.] By at least January 1999, the restriction on the 187,502 shares had expired, and the 
Radmans proceeded to sell all of their shares. [R. 4870.] Collectively, the Radmans 
received $743,585 from the sale of the shares. [R. 4870.] For purposes of the calculation 
to be made under Paragraph 9(a) of the Agreement, the Shortfall totaled $756,431. [R. 
4870.] As permitted by the Agreement, on January 29, 1999, the Radmans requested, 
through written correspondence, that Flanders issue the additional shares to make up the 
Shortfall. [R. 4870.] On April 27, 1999, Flanders issued 94,554 additional shares of 
restricted Flanders stock to the Radmans. [R. 4870.] Flanders arrived at this number of 
shortfall shares by dividing the shortfall amount by the denominator of $8 per share. 
Warranties 
The Merger Agreement also contained certain warranties. The preamble to 
Section 2 of the Agreement, entitled "Representations and Warranties of the G.F.I. 
Shareholders," reads as follows: 
To induce Flanders and Acquisitions, Inc. to enter into this Agreement, the 
G.F.I. Shareholders represent and warrant to Flanders and Acquisitions, 
Inc. that the following statements are true, correct and complete as of the 
date hereof, and will be true, correct and complete as of the date of Closing. 
[Ex. P-L] Section 2(h) reads as follows: 
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The GFI Shareholders have not made any material misstatement of fact or 
omitted to state any material fact necessary or desirable to make complete, 
accurate and not misleading every representation and warranty set forth 
herein. 
[Ex. P-1.] The preamble to Section 3 of the Agreement, entitled "Representations and 
Warranties of G.F.I.," reads as follows: 
To further induce Flanders and Acquisitions, Inc. to enter into this 
Agreement, G.F.I, and the G.F.I. Shareholders jointly and severally 
represent and warrant the following statements concerning the affairs of 
G.F.L are true, correct and complete as of the date hereof, and will be true, 
correct and complete as of the date of Closing as that term is defined in 
Section 6(a). 
[Ex. P-1.] Section 3(h) of the Agreement, reads as follows: 
Assets. Except as set forth on the Disclosure Schedule, GFI owns, 
possesses and controls and has good and marketable title to all of its assets, 
free and clear of any mortgage, lien, claim, effect, charge, encumbrance and 
right of third parties. Such assets are in good operating condition and 
repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted, and conform to applicable 
ordinances, regulations, building, zoning and other laws and directives. 
GFI enjoys exclusive, peaceful and undisturbed possession under all 
equipment and other leases to which it is a party. All such leases are 
identified on the Disclosure Schedules, are valid and enforceable in 
accordance with their terms, and no party thereto is in default thereunder. 
[Ex. P-1.] (emphasis added). Section 3(d) reads as follows: 
Financial Statements. The financial statements contained in the unaudited 
tax returns of GFI for the years ended June 30, 1994, June 30, 1995, and 
June 30, 1996, which are attached hereto as Schedule 3(d) to the Disclosure 
Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit B (the "Disclosure Schedule"), fairly 
represent the financial condition of GFI as at the dates described 
therein. 
[Ex. P-1.] (emphasis added). 
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Flanders primary purpose in acquiring GFI was to acquire two pieces of fiberglass 
manufacturing equipment known as "electric melters." [R. 4877.] Prior to the merger, 
Ivan Radman made a number of critical representations which the trial court found to be 
untrue. For example, Mr. Radman told Steve Clark that the electric melters were 
"complete and that they were operating efficiently" and GFI was profitable as a result. 
[R. 4877.] Prior to the merger, Ivan Radman also told Steve Clark that one person could 
run two electric melters, which would result in significant cost savings for Flanders. 
Such promised labor savings were necessary to meet the primary commercial purpose for 
which Flanders was acquiring GFI, which was to lower its acquisition cost of Modigliani 
fiberglass from approximately 4 cents per square foot to 2 to 2 Vi cents per square foot. 
[R. 4877-78.] 
In addition, prior to the merger, Ivan Radman told Steve Clark that each electric 
melter was producing 20 pads per day, [R. 4878], and that the electric melters could 
produce fiberglass for 2 to 2 Vi cents per square foot, a figure significantly below 
Flanders' cost of purchasing fiberglass, and provided Steve Clark a spreadsheet to that 
effect. [R. 4878-79.] Mr. Radman's representations were false. [R. 4879.] 
As of the date of the merger and the date of Closing, the electric melters did not 
conform to the Radmans' representations. [R. 4880.] The electric melters were not 
capable of producing 20 pads each in a single day, and had never actually done so. [R. 
4880.] On the date of the merger, at least two workers were required to run a single 
electric melter, and GFI had never had a single worker run two electric melters. [R. 
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4881.] As of the date of the merger and the date of Closing, the electric melters suffered 
from a number of problems, including fiber breakage, uneven temperature across the 
bushings, breakage of the bushings, bridging, transformers "blowing up," and problems 
with the "weave" of the fiberglass, all of which prevented the electric melters from 
operating consistently and producing fiberglass of reasonable quality. [R. 4881.] The 
Radmans did not inform Flanders that the electric melters had the above problems prior 
to the effective date of the Agreement or prior to Closing. [R. 4882.] In fact, the 
Radmans deliberately tried to hide these problems from Flanders by, among other things, 
instructing their employees to have only one person manning the electric melters when 
Flanders personnel were in the plant. [R.4943 p. 459-60.] Despite its due diligence, 
Flanders did not know that the electric melters had these problems prior to the effective 
date of the Agreement or prior to Closing. [R. 4882.] As of the date of the merger and 
the date of Closing, the electric melters were not capable of running consistently for any 
length of time, were broken more than they were working, and in particular could not run 
anywhere close to 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, as is typically required of that type 
of industrial equipment. [R. 4883.] 
Flanders spent substantial amounts of time and nearly $1.3 million to modify and 
redesign the electric melters subsequent to the acquisition. [R. 4885.] In addition, 
Flanders' actual production costs using the electric melters significantly exceeded the 
production cost promised by Ivan Radman and generally exceeded the cost at which 
Flanders could acquire Modigliani fiberglass from a third party. [R. 4885-86.] 
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Flanders' predominant purpose in acquiring GFI was to acquire the electric 
melters. [R. 4883.] Except for the warranties relating to the electric melters, GFI would 
have been of no interest to Flanders. [R. 4883.] Both parties intended that the essence of 
the merger transaction was for Flanders to acquire the electric melters, and Flanders took 
the other assets of GFI simply as part of the package to get those electric melters. [R. 
4883.] 
GFI was not operating at a profit, taking into account all of its actual expenses, 
and the Radmans were operating GFI predominantly for the purpose of developing the 
electric melters. [R. 4884.] 
Of the purchase price, Flanders paid $337,472 to acquire the inventory on hand 
and accounts receivable of GFI. [R. 4884.] With the exception of the electric melters, the 
remaining assets of GFI had essentially no value. [R. 4884.] The remaining $1,162,528 
of purchase price, after allocating the amounts to inventory and accounts receivable, was 
paid for the electric melters. [R. 4885.] Since the electric melters did not operate as 
warranted and did not conform to industry standards, the electric melters had no value 
and Flanders was damaged in the amount of $1,162,528. [R. 4885.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Radmans' argument that the trial court improperly admitted "extrinsic 
evidence5' is insufficiently briefed, since the allegedly improper evidence is never 
identified. Moreover, the trial court was permitted to hear any evidence that might have 
been "extrinsic" for the purposes of determining whether the contract was ambiguous and 
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to determine factually whether a breach occurred, and there is no showing that the court 
used any such evidence for any other purpose. 
The Radmans' argument that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the warranties 
at issue also fails. The trial court found that those warranties were unambiguous and 
interpreted them according to their plain language. The Radmans have not shown how 
those interpretations were wrong or even advanced alternative interpretations based on 
the contract language. 
The Radmans' argument that the trial court erred in its findings regarding the 
damages suffered by Flanders fails for several reasons. First, the trial court used the 
proper measure of damages for a breach of warranty - the difference between the value 
of the particular asset as warranted and its actual value. The trial court's factual findings 
as to those values was adequately supported by the evidence, and the Radmans' 
challenges to those factual findings were insufficiently marshalled and briefed. 
The trial court properly ruled that Flanders' award had to be offset against the 
Radmans' award prior to computing prejudgment interest. This is simply the correct 
legal method, since the two awards arose out of the same contract. Moreover, Flanders' 
award actually arose first, meaning that the Radmans were never deprived of the use of 
their money. 
Finally, the Radmans' "atmosphere of prejudice" argument is unsupported by any 
law. In addition, it is based upon only vague allegations of evidentiary and procedural 
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error. The Radmans were obligated to properly brief and argue those underlying 
assignments of error, which they failed to do. 
Regarding the Cross-Appeal, the trial court erred in finding that the market 
protection clause of the Merger Agreement was ambiguous, since there is really only one 
interpretation of the language of the agreement that is plausible. 
The trial court also erred in its interpretation of the market protection clause, as it 
added terms and computations and essentially rewrote the contract provision rather than 
restricting itself to interpreting the actual language used. 
Finally, the trial court erred in finding that the Radmans were co-prevailing parties 
in this lawsuit, as guidance from this Court states that there can only be one prevailing 
party, and Flanders was that party. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Evidence of the Radmans' Pre-Closing 
Statements. 
The Radmans claim that the trial court improperly admitted "evidence regarding 
the parties' pre-merger negotiations related to performance standards." [See Appellant 
Brief, pp. 2 and 16.] Flanders notes that the Radmans do not specifically identify this 
allegedly improper evidence, do not provide citations to the record to identify where this 
allegedly improper evidence was presented, objected to and received (as required by 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(e)), and do not demonstrate that this allegedly 
improper evidence was indeed improper. This argument is insufficiently briefed and 
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should be dismissed, since this Court "is not ca depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research.'" West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 
UT 27,1|29, 135P.3d874. 
Although Flanders is not sure exactly what evidence is being questioned, it does 
not matter, since the trial court's ruling regarding the warranty of "good operating 
condition" is clearly based only on the contract language. The entirety of the trial court's 
conclusions of law on this issue are as follows: 
10. In deciding Flanders' claim for breach of the Section 3(h) warranty, 
the Court must interpret the phrase "good operating condition, ordinary 
wear and tear excepted." 
11. Based on the evidence that has been presented, the Court finds that 
the arguments and the evidence that have been presented from both parties 
demonstrate that the phrase "good operating condition, ordinary wear and 
tear excepted" is only capable of one reasonable interpretation and that the 
phrase is therefore not ambiguous. WebBank v. American General Annuity 
Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ 20. 
12. Therefore, based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court 
interprets the phrase "good operating condition, ordinary wear and tear 
excepted" to mean that the equipment performs the function expected of a 
similar piece of equipment in the industry to the standards of the industry, 
modified to take into account the effects of the equipment's age and prior 
wear. 
13. The industry standard for a melter is consistent operation 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week at least 90% of the time. 
14. At the time of the merger and the Closing, the electric melters did 
not conform to this standard, as they would break often and for various 
reasons. 
15. Accordingly, the Radmans breached their warranty that the assets of 
GFI would be in "good operating condition, ordinary wear and tear 
excepted" as of the date of the merger and the date of Closing. 
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None of these findings mention any pre-merger statements or other parol evidence, nor 
have the Radmans' shown how these findings were in some way influenced by such 
evidence. Therefore, even if the trial court committed error, which it did not. any such 
error was harmless and does not warrant reversal. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of 
St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) ("An erroneous decision to admit or 
exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful.") 
However, no error occurred, because the trial court was fully entitled to hear 
evidence of the course of negotiations and events prior to the merger (which appears to 
be the general universe of evidence the Radmans are objecting to) for at least two 
reasons: (1) to determine whether the warranties were in fact ambiguous, and (2) to 
determine whether the Radmans' breached the "no material misstatements" warranty. All 
of the evidence admitted at trial was properly admissible for these purposes. "Trial 
courts are afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we 
will not disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse 
of discretion." Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339,1j9, 121 P.3d 33 (quoting Vigil v. 
Division of Child & Family Servs., 2005 UT App 43, ^|8, 107 P.3d 716). 
It is incontrovertible that the trial court was entitled to review "extrinsic evidence" 
to determine whether the warranties were in fact ambiguous. See Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 
2003 UT 37, f7, 78 P.3d 600; Uintah Basin Med Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, ^13, 
110 P.3d 168 (internal citations omitted). It is also clear that the trial court was entitled 
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to hear any and all facts offered for the purpose of proving that a breach occurred. See 
Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, ^21, 27 P.3d 565 (parol evidence 
is evidence "offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated 
contract.'' (emphasis added)). "Whether there was a breach of warranty is a question of 
fact" and the trial court, as the finder of fact in this bench trial, was entitled to hear all 
evidence relevant to whether a breach occurred. Morris v. Parkinson, 2001 UT App 69 
(not for official publication) (quoting Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Giles, 59 
Utah 54, 202 P. 543, 544 (Utah 1921)); Shar's Cars, LLC v. Elder, 2004 UT App 258, 
]^30, 97 P.3d 724. The trial court found that numerous Radman pre-merger statements 
constituted breaches of warranty, and the Radmans have not properly challenged those 
factual findings nor marshalled the evidence against those findings. [R. 4888-89.] 
The category of evidence that the Radmans appear to object to was therefore 
properly admitted for the purposes for which it was used and the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings should be affirmed. 
II. The Court Properly Interpreted the Warranties. 
Although not properly identified as an issue in the Radmans' brief, the Radmans' 
appear to argue that the trial court's interpretations of two of the warranties at issue in 
this case were erroneous. The first relevant warranty is found in section 3(h) of the 
Merger Agreement (the "Good Operating Condition Warranty"), which states: 
(h) Assets. Except as set forth on the Disclosure Schedule, GFI owns, 
possesses and controls and has good and marketable title to all of its assets, 
free and clear of any mortgage, lien, claim, effect, charge, encumbrance and 
right of third parties. Such assets are in good operating condition and 
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repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted, and conform to applicable 
ordinances, regulations, building, zoning and other laws and directives. 
GFI enjoys exclusive, peaceful and undisturbed possession under all 
equipment and other leases to which it is a party. All such leases are 
identified on the Disclosure Schedules, are valid and enforceable in 
accordance with their terms, and no party thereto is in default thereunder. 
[Ex. P-l, Section 3(h), (emphasis added).] The second relevant warranty is the warranty 
found in Section 2(h) of the Merger Agreement (the "No Misrepresentations Warranty"), 
which states: 
The GFI Shareholders [Radmans] have not made any material misstatement 
of fact or omitted to state any material fact necessary or desirable to make 
complete, accurate and not misleading every representation and warranty 
set forth herein. 
[Ex. P-l, Section 2(h).] The trial court found that both of these warranties were 
unambiguous and proceeded to interpret them according to the language of the Merger 
Agreement. [R. 4887-4889.] The trial court's interpretations are consistent with the 
Merger Agreement and prior case law, and are unremarkable. Although the Radmans' 
brief contains much rhetoric about the trial court having gone beyond the language of the 
Merger Agreement, in the end the Radmans fail to show how the trial court did so. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the Good Operating Condition 
Warranty. 
The trial court interpreted the language '"good operating condition, ordinary wear 
and tear excepted' to mean that the equipment performs the function expected of a similar 
piece of equipment in the industry to the standards of the industry, modified to take into 
account the effects of the equipment's age and prior wear." [R. 4889, [^12.] This is a 
perfectly reasonable interpretation of the language used and is entirely consistent with the 
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Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of "good condition and repair" as meaning "that the 
condition of the article is reasonably good, 'comparing favorably with other articles of 
like kind, in view of the average quality of such articles.'" Utah State Medical Ass'n v. 
Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982). The case cited by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Medical Ass }n held that "when the word 'good' is 
used to describe the 'quality' or 'condition' of a chattel, it may be found to be an 
affirmation of fact that the chattel is sound, reliable and right, as opposed to the 
characterization 'poor condition.'" Schwartz v. Gross, 93 Ohio App. 445, 451 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1952). 
In this case, the words "good operating condition" and the context of the Merger 
Agreement justified the trial court in determining that the condition of each piece of 
equipment should be compared to similar equipment "operating" in the industry. In any 
event, the trial court was entitled to hear evidence regarding any industry-specific 
meaning of the term "good operating condition", as when "particular expressions have by 
trade usage acquired a different meaning, and both parties are engaged in that trade, the 
parties to the contract are deemed to have used them according to their different and 
peculiar sense as shown by such trade usage." Ermolieffv. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 
19 Cal. 2d 543, 550 (Cal. 1942); see also Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 566 Pa. 
494, 501 (Pa. 2001) ("custom in the industry or usage in the trade is always relevant and 
admissible in construing commercial contracts"). This does not violate the parol 
evidence rule because "the usage evidence does not alter the contract of the parties, but 
190147_4DOC i n 
on the contrary gives the effect to the words there used as intended by the parties." 
Ermolieff, 19 Cal. 2d at 550. The Radmans have failed to identify an alternate 
interpretation that comports with the contractual language or show that the trial court*s 
interpretation was erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court's interpretation should be 
affirmed. 
To be sure, the Good Operating Condition Warranty does require some factual 
findings. The warranty is broadly worded and applies to each separate piece of 
equipment owned by GFI. The trial court was required to determine factually what 
would be a similar piece of equipment, how it should perform, and whether the 
equipment at issue met that standard, and it did so with respect to the electric melters. [R. 
4889.] These, however, are factual findings, and the Radmans have neither briefed this 
issue nor have they marshaled the evidence with respect to those factual findings. It is 
now too late for them to do so. Accordingly, the trial court's findings related to this 
warranty must be assumed to be correct, and the trial court affirmed. See Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ffi|19 and 80, 100 P.3d 1177. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the No Misrepresentations 
Warranty. 
The trial court's interpretation of the No Misrepresentations Warranty is equally 
correct. The trial court interpreted the plain language of the provision as a warranty "that 
any statements of fact made by them [the Radmans] prior to November 26, 1997, were 
true and that the Radmans did not omit to tell Flanders any fact that would be 'necessary 
or desirable to make complete, accurate and not misleading' all of the other 
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representations and warranties in the Agreement, including the Section 3(d) and 3(h) 
warranties." [R. 4887, ]^5.] This interpretation is also entirely consistent with the plain 
language of the provision, and the Radmans have not identified an alternate interpretation 
nor have they shown how this interpretation is erroneous. 
Rather, the Radmans appear to object to the trial court's factual findings that 
certain statements the Radmans made were "necessary or desirable" to inform Flanders as 
to the other warranties in the Merger Agreement. However, "trial courts are afforded 
broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence" and those determinations 
will only be disturbed if there is "an abuse of discretion." Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 
339, P9 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Vigil v. Division of Child & Family Servs., 2005 
UT App 43, P8, 107 P.3d 716). Whether a particular piece of evidence is relevant or 
helpful to a determination of whether a breach of a warranty has occurred is a factual 
determination, and again the Radmans failed to brief this issue or marshal the evidence 
with respect to these factual findings. Accordingly, the trial court's interpretation of this 
warranty and factual determination that the Radmans breached this warranty by making 
numerous false representations regarding the electric melters [R. 4878-79] should be 
affirmed. 
III. The Trial Court Used the Proper Standard for Damages 
After finding that the electric melters did not meet the Good Operating Condition 
Warranty and that the Radmans breached the No Misstatements Warranty, the trial court 
was required to determine the damages suffered by Flanders. The measure of damages 
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for breach of a warranty, as correctly noted by the trial court [R. 4890 f 16], is the excess 
of the value the asset would have had if it had been as warranted over the actual value of 
the asset. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150 (Utah App. 1992); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §70A-2-714.' In this case, the breach of the Good Operating Condition Warranty 
related to the condition of the electric melters. [R. 4889-90.] No warranty as to the 
condition or value of the GFI stock was at issue, and the cases cited by the Radmans 
related to the valuation of stock in dissenters rights cases are completely irrelevant. 
Therefore, the trial court was obligated to find the value of the electric melters as 
warranted and their actual value, the difference being one part of Flanders' damages. Of 
course, finding the value of an asset is not a matter of contract interpretation, but is an 
issue of fact. See Hogle v. Zinetics Med.f Inc., 2002 UT 121, \ 10, 63 P.3d 80; Wasatch 
Bank v. Leany, 727 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1986). The trial court correctly concluded, after 
hearing all of the evidence, that the value in this traasaction was in the assets of GFI (and 
not its goodwill, trade name, client list, or other intangibles), and therefore, for purposes 
1
 Although Flanders recognizes that the warranties at issue are not governed by the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-101 et seq. ("UCC"), the result 
under the UCC is helpful to a resolution of this issue. 
In fact, it makes no sense to talk about the "operating condition" of stock. Notably, the 
trial court also found that the Radmans breached the warranty regarding the financial 
condition of the company as the warranted tax returns omitted material expenses that 
should have appeared in them. [R. 4887.] This warranty arguably relates to the value of 
the stock, however the trial court found that Flanders had not met its burden of 
establishing its damages from the breach of this warranty, demonstrating the trial court's 
understanding of the difference between a warranty dealing with equipment and a 
warranty dealing with the company as an entity. 
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of finding the value of the assets as warranted, the transaction could be analogized to an 
asset purchase. [R. 4884 f 36.] Far from an "interpretation" of the contract, this was 
simply a factual finding regarding where the value in the transaction lay. 
The trial court then made the factual determination that, aside from the liquid 
assets (accounts receivable, inventory) and the electric melters, the rest of the GFI assets 
were essentially worthless. This finding is supported by extensive evidence from Mr. 
Mercer, whom the Court recognized as an expert in the industry, as to the condition and 
value of the GFI equipment, including the electric melters. [R. 4944 pp. 610-16 and 703-
18.] The trial court then made factual findings as to the value of the accounts receivable 
and inventory, leaving a simple arithmetic equation to determine the value of the melters 
as warranted. [R. 4884-85.] 
The Radmans' persistence in referring to the trial court's value findings as an 
"interpretation" of the contract is puzzling. Fully half of their briefing on this issue 
relates to purported "subjective intent" evidence, alleged "extrinsic evidence", and the 
trial court's alleged "interpretation" of the contract as an asset purchase. These concepts 
are entirely irrelevant to the trial court's consideration of evidence and factual 
determination as to the value of an asset. 
A. The Trial Court's Factual Finding of the Value of the Electric Melters as 
Warranted is Correct. 
Aside from their perplexing contract-based arguments, the Radmans assert that the 
trial court's factual finding that the value of the electric melters as warranted was 
$1,162,528 was clearly erroneous. This argument fails on both procedural and 
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substantive grounds. First, the Radmans failed to properly marshal the evidence in their 
challenge to this factual finding. Second, the trial court's finding was correct on the 
merits. The trial court looked to the substance of the transaction rather than its form, see 
MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626. 629 (Utah 1995); Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 
1300, 1303 (Utah 1982), and applied the commonsense approach that the best evidence 
of the value of the electric melters was the value placed on them by the parties 
themselves. Here there was no other practical way to determine the value of these novel 
pieces of equipment, and the trial court's findings should be affirmed. 
1. The Radmans Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
The Radmans' effort to marshal the evidence related to the trial court's finding of 
the value of the electric melters as warranted is a hopelessly short list of eleven "facts" 
that they allege are the only facts relevant to this determination in this entire 9-day trial, 
with no explanation of even those bare facts or how they support the trial court's 
conclusions. To successfully challenge the trial court's findings, the Radmans "must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal 
quotations omitted). The Radmans are not allowed to just marshal some of the evidence, 
but are required to "present 'every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists' and then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence.'" T.H. v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2006 UT 36,1f64, 137 P.3d 809. The Radmans are 
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then required to describe how the evidence presented related to and supported the trial 
court's conclusion: 
To appropriately marshal evidence, parties must 'provide a precisely 
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they 
challenge. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence 
with the challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred 
in the assessment of that evidence to its findings/ Indeed, parties 
challenging factual findings must'fully embrace the adversary's position' 
and play 'devil's advocate.' 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, p 0 , 112 P.3d 495. The Radmans may not simply "re-
argue the factual case presented in the trial court" and also cannot merely present 
carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in support of their position. Chen 
2004 UT 82 at f78. If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, the court assumes that all 
findings are adequately supported by the evidence. See id. at f 19 and Tf80. 
The Radmans have failed to meet this burden. First, their paltry list of eleven 
"facts" omits an enormous amount of relevant and persuasive evidence. For example, the 
Radmans failed to marshal the following relevant evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding of the value of the electric melter as warranted: 
1. Ivan Radman testified that all of the GFI equipment other than the electric 
melters was purchased at a bankruptcy auction in approximately 1990. [R. 4942 p. 45.] 
Ivan Radman testified that at the time the Radmans purchased those assets out of 
bankruptcy, the assets were already 25 years old. [R. 4942 p. 46.] These two facts 
support a conclusion that the assets of GFI other than the electric melters were old, in 
relatively poor condition, and had very little value as operating assets. 
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2. A major focus of the Radmans' discussions with Steve Clark was the 
electric melters and their potential benefit to Flanders. [R. 4942 pp. 53 and 61-72; 
R.4946 pp. 275-78.] This supports the trial court's finding that both parties viewed the 
purchase of the electric melters as the primary purpose of this transaction. 
3. Ivan Radman considered the existing GFI melters to be "filthy, dirty, they 
were hard to work with" and the Radmans' primary purpose in running GFI was to build 
the electric melters. [R. 4942 pp. 48-49.] In addition, the Radmans specifically told their 
employees to make the electric melters look artificially efficient when Flanders viewed 
the plant prior to the merger. [R.4942 p. 460.] 
4. Ivan Radman represented that the electric melters were complete and fully 
operational at a very high level of efficiency. [R. 4942 pp. 53 and 152.] Ivan Radman 
told Steve Clark that the electric melters produced more than twice as much fiberglass 
than the gas melters (which were the other GFI assets) using half the labor of the gas 
melters, and were producing fiberglass at 2 to 2 Vi cents per square foot. [R. 4942 pp. 
151-61.] Moreover, Ivan Radman asked Rodney Smith to prepare spreadsheets showing 
the cost per square foot of fiberglass produced on the electric melters. [R. 4943 pp. 504-
09.] These facts support the trial court's conclusion that the value of this transaction lay 
in the electric melters, since this evidence shows that the Radmans' were particularly 
focused on selling Flanders on the benefits of the electric melters, and not the other assets 
of GFI. 
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5. Ivan Radman testified that the Radmans had tried unsuccessfully to sell 
GFI to other companies prior to the transaction with Flanders. Ivan Radman "would have 
sold Fiber - GFI the week I bought it, because I don't like that kind of system..." [R. 
4942 pp. 54-55.] In fact, the evidence suggests that Ivan Radman told his employees that 
he was going to shut down GFI. [R. 4942 pp. 55-56 and 452-54.] This evidence further 
highlights the poor condition and worthlessness of the GFI assets as an operation. 
6. Darrell Cossey, GFFs maintenance manager, testified that other than the 
electric melters, the GFI equipment had been unchanged since 1978, and had been 
operating for years prior to 1978. [R. 4943 pp. 410-12.] James Mercer, recognized by 
the trial court as one of the few experts in this field [R. 4881-82 |^26 and 4883 TJ31] 
testified that, other than the electric melters, the GFI equipment was old and the vast 
majority of it was in poor condition. [R. 4944 pp. 610-16.] This further emphasizes the 
worthlessness of the GFI assets other than the electric melters. 
7. The Merger Agreement values the transaction at $ 1,500,016. [Ex. P-1.] 
The value given to the transaction by the parties supports the trial court's finding of the 
amount of value to allocate to the assets transferred in the transaction. 
8. The Radmans warranted that the tax returns accurately represented the 
financial condition of GFI, which includes the value of its assets. [Ex. P-l.] Those tax 
returns state the value of the inventory as $88,353, the value of accounts receivable as 
$249,119, and the value of all of the rest of the assets as $5,749. [Ex. P-l, Schedule 
3(d).] This warranted information supports both the trial court's finding that the assets 
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other than the electric melters were worthless, and the trial court's computation of the 
value of the electric melters as warranted by taking the value of the transaction and 
subtracting the value of the inventory and accounts receivable. 
The above facts, in addition to those "marshaled" by the Radmans, provide a more 
than adequate basis for the trial court's finding that the GFI assets other than the electric 
melters were valueless and that the Radmans and Flanders both viewed the electric 
melters as comprising the value in this transaction. 
Second, the Radmans failed to adequately perform their marshalling obligation 
even with respect to the few facts they did identify. Marshalling requires the party to 
show the appellate court how the facts identified could have convinced the trial court to 
make its factual finding. See Parduhn, 2005 UT 22, [^30. The Radmans, however, 
simply listed a few facts, failed to describe their significance, and moved right along to 
re-arguing the position they took at trial. Since the Radmans have failed to marshal the 
evidence regarding this factual finding, the finding is presumed correct and the trial court 
ruling should be affirmed. 
2. No Clear Error 
If this Court were to review the trial court's findings of fact, those findings 
entered by the trial court are reviewed by an appellate court under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). "For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must 
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by 
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the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f25, 108 P.3d 710. 
Even had the Radmans properly fulfilled their duty to marshal the evidence, which 
they did not, they simply cannot show that the trial court's factual determination did not 
have adequate support. The evidence described above show that the assets, other than the 
electric melters, were old and in poor condition, that both Flanders and the Radmans 
viewed the electric melters as the primary assets of GFI and the purpose for the merger, 
and that the inventory and accounts receivable had a value of $88,353 and $249,119, 
respectively. Since the trial court's factual findings are supported by adequate evidence 
they should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding That the Actual Value of the Electric Melters 
Was Zero Is Correct. 
The Radmans begin their argument regarding this finding of fact by "marshalling 
the evidence" with the following ipse dixit: "the list of evidence marshalled above is also 
the evidence upon which the trial court might have based its calculation of this value." 
[Appellant Brief p. 39.] This is a very odd statement, in which the Radmans are alleging 
that the trial court relied on eleven facts, and only those eleven, for both the finding that 
the electric melters should have had a value of over one million dollars and the finding 
that the electric melters actually had a value of zero. This rather incongruous statement 
then spawns a tangential argument based entirely upon the Radmans' interpretation of a 
Confidentiality and Nondisclosure Agreement (which the trial court never interpreted) 
dated two and a half years after the merger. 
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With respect to their challenge to this factual finding, the Radmans have utterly 
failed to marshal any evidence (aside from their entirely inconsistent statement) and have 
in no way shown how the trial court might have arrived at its factual conclusion. In fact, 
there is plenty of evidence not marshalled by the Radmans to support the finding that the 
electric melters had no value: 
1. Ivan Radman testified that the electric melters might still be experimental. [R. 
4942 p. 96.] When juxtaposed with Ivan Radman's representation that the electric 
melters were complete and fully operational at a very high level of efficiency, [R. 4942 
pp. 53 and 152], this evidence supports the trial court's finding that the electric melters in 
fact did not have operational value as was warranted. 
2. Fiberglass manufacturing is a very small margin business that relies upon high 
volume continuous manufacturing to make a profit. [R. 4942 pp. 197-98.] 
3. Production of fiberglass on the electric melters was sporadic and low-volume, 
and Flanders could have purchased fiberglass cheaper than they manufactured it on the 
electric melters. [R. 4942 pp. 199 and 258.] 
4. In fact, the electric melters were inoperable at least as often as they were 
operable. [R. 4943 p. 419.] 
5. Darrell Cossey, Rodney Smith, and James Mercer described a host of operating 
problems with the electric melters that would cause the machines to be shut down for 
extended periods of time. [R. 4943 pp. 420-446 and 512-16; R. 4944 pp. 703-18.] 
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6. Flanders spent at least $1,377,304.19 in projects designed to repair the electric 
melters. [R. 4945 p. 60.] 
7. Flanders completely wrote-off the GFI assets for accounting purposes. [R. 
4942 pp. 252-554.] 
This list comprises only part of the evidence that should have been marshalled by the 
Radmans and was not. Since the Radmans have failed to satisfy their burden to marshal 
the evidence, the trial court's rulings are assumed to be correct. 
Moreover, one tangential fact (the Confidentiality Agreement) that might arguably 
conflict with the trial court's ruling is hardly a sufficient basis for a conclusion that the 
finding was "clearly erroneous." Accordingly, the trial court's determination should be 
affirmed. 
IV. The Court's Ruling Denying Prejudgment Interest Is Correct. 
The Radmans argue that the trial court erred in denying them an award of 
prejudgment interest before Flanders' offset is applied because: (1) Flanders is not 
entitled to prejudgment interest, (2), and the awards arise on different dates. The 
Radmans base these arguments on misguided interpretations of the case law, which do 
not comport with the purpose or logic behind offsets and prejudgment interest. As 
explained below, the Radmans' arguments in favor of preserving their prejudgment 
interest award fail based on well-established legal principles. 
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A- There is no requirement that both awards must have prejudgment interest 
in order to offset the awards. 
The Radmans misinterpret and misapply Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 152 
(Utah App. 1992), when they claim that because Flanders has not been awarded 
prejudgment interest, the parties' awards cannot offset each other until after the 
Radmans' prejudgment interest is calculated. Contrary to the Radmans' stated position, 
Utah law does not require that "both awards are entitled to prejudgment interest." 
Flanders is not aware of any such requirement in, or out, of Utah. The mere fact that 
Brown dealt with a situation where both parties were entitled to an award of prejudgment 
interest does not mean that an offset should not be deducted if one party is not entitled to 
an award of prejudgment interest. 
Although Utah courts have not specifically addressed the issue of whether an 
unliquidated counterclaim should be offset before prejudgment interest is awarded on a 
liquidated claim, Utah law appears consistent with the rules articulated by other courts 
facing this precise issue. See Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Management, 2005 UT App 430 
{^37, 124 P.3d 269 ("All that is required is that the offsets be deducted before the interest 
is calculated."). See also Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah 
1996); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 152 (Utah App. 1992). Other courts facing this 
issue have applied several different rules, depending on the factual situation, to determine 
how prejudgment interest should be addressed in light of competing claims. See, e.g., 
Local Oklahoma Bank v. The United States, 59 Fed. CI. 713, 722-23 (Fed. CI. 2004) 
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(explaining four possible rules: interest on the balance, interest on the entire claim, 
conversion of the liquidated claim, and counterclaim as a discount). 
When "one party has a liquidated claim subject to prejudgment interest and the 
other party has an unliquidated set-off, not subject to prejudgment interest, the rule on 
calculating depends on whether the claims are related." Id. at 722. When "both claims 
arise out of related transactions, courts employ the 'interest on the balance' rule." Id. 
Applying the "interest on the balance" rule, prejudgment interest is available only on the 
net difference between the two claims, and the amount of the counterclaim is offset 
against the liquidated claim. Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm 
Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 212 (8th Cir. 1969)). Interest is then calculated on the 
balance due after deducting the offset. Id. The objective of the rule is to compensate for 
lost use of money only to the extent of the difference between the two claims. Id. The 
interest on the balance rule has been applied in numerous situations similar to the present 
case, as demonstrated below, and should be applied here. 
As a matter of first impression in Wyoming, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
addressed whether prejudgment interest should be awarded when one party has a 
liquidated claim and the other party seeks to offset its unliquidated claim. Hollon v. 
McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981). The court looked to the Supreme Courts of 
Colorado and Arizona for guidance. Id. (quoting Fairway Builders, Inc. v. Malouf 
Towers Rental Co., Inc., 603 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1979) (stating "if the unliquidated 
counterclaim offsets are attributable to the same contracts which are the basis of the 
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primary liquidated claims, those claims and the unliquidated counterclaims are offset and 
prejudgment interest is allowed only on the net difference"); York Plumbing & Heating 
Co. v. Groussman Investment Co., 443 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968) (holding that an 
unliquidated claim should be offset against a liquidated claim prior to the computation of 
interest at least in those cases where the claims arise out of the same general 
transaction")). Following their reasoning, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled: 
A contractor should not be allowed to perform his obligations poorly, and 
thus force a purchaser to make expenditures correcting the shoddy work, 
and still collect interest on all the monies owed to him under the contract. 
Since the contractor should have expended the money the purchaser paid to 
repair the purchase, the contractor should not be entitled to prejudgment 
interest on that amount. The money the purchaser properly used to correct 
the defects in the contractor's work should be viewed as having been paid 
to the contractor, thus canceling any debt up to that amount. 
Id. at 518. Thus, the Wyoming court concluded that "[i]t simply would not make good 
sense to charge appellees interest on money they do not owe." Id. 
Other courts have also held that prejudgment interest cannot be added to a 
liquidated claim until after the court offsets the amount of a related, unliquidated 
counterclaim. See, e.g., Harmon Cable Comm. of Neb. Ltd. Pt. v. Scope Cable T.V., Inc., 
468 N.W.2d 350, 371 (Neb. 1991). This rule is generally applicable where the liquidated 
claim and the offsetting unliquidated claim arise from the same transaction or contract. 
See, e.g., York Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Groussman Inv. Co., 443 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo. 
1968). Of particular significance to this appeal, the rule always applies where 
the unliquidated counterclaim is for defective goods or performance and the liquidated 
claim is for failure to pay for those goods or performance. See, e.g., Gemini Farms v. 
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Smith-Kern Ellensburg, Inc., 10 P.3d 82, 84 (V\ ash. App. iUOlj, I uwnuy Builders, Inc. v. 
MaloufTowcn Rental Co . .'•/• . 603 P.2d 51". 537-38 (Ari/ 1079). 
Here, I vlai idei s' coi u ltei claim arose fi on i tl le sai i le coi ltract as tl le Radmans' claim 
for failure t * r - . Moreover, the Court awarded Flanders over $1 million because it 
found that GFFs primary asset —the electric nielters were so flawed as to be valueless 
and that the nduuiun , ;,tn. i...iai iw perform under the contrail h\ breathing a number of 
not entitled to prejudgment interest on their liquidated daim until llit ulisel of the amount 
awarded to I vlanders, Because thk m J court warded Flanders m.ore than twi.ee what it 
awarded Ihr lJ\n\n\inv\ (heir >*;m be nr prenidj'.inenl inhT,Md inMirdnl lr \hv Iniiilfiuiii". 
following application of the olivet. [R. 4893.] 
Moreover, it VT"M 1-~ inconsistent with the purpose for awarding prejudgment 
interest: i i : t tc •. -t,d: - ;; 
allowed "to compensate for the lull loss suffered Iv 'he plaintiff in luring the use oi the 
money over time." /Traa/z t Merita^ /////?(«'/V?0I,MI T\ r ?01 f75, 71 P.3d 188. In 
tl lis case , tl le ti ial coi in t foi « id tl lat tl le damage • * . *
 v pi MI . aamage to 
the Radmans, and that the Radmans were never denied the u^ of any inune* i R 4Xl>3 | 
Accordingly, the Radmans were entitled \o n*- further payment of the purchase price until 
I rlai idei s' damages \ v ei e of fset. 
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B. The Radmans are misguided in their argument that the awards must arise 
at the same time. 
The Radmans argue that the awards at issue arose at different times and, thus, 
prejudgment interest should be calculated prior to the offset. The Radmans appear to 
base their argument on a literal interpretation of the statement in Richard Barton 
Enterprises that "offsets should be deducted before interest is calculated when an interest 
bearing award arises at the same time as the offsets." Richard Barton Enters. , Inc. v. 
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah 1996) (citing Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 152 
(UtahApp. 1992)). Such a literal interpretation is too narrow and misplaced. While the 
Utah courts have not squarely addressed the issue presently before this Court, the 
statement from Richard Barton Enterprises is actually consistent with the authority cited 
herein. Indeed, the language "same time," as used in Richard Barton Enterprises, should 
be equated with the language used by other courts, such as "same general transaction," 
York Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Groussman Inv. Co., 443 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo. 1968), 
"same transaction," Harmon Cable Comm. of Neb. Ltd. Ft. v. Scope Cable T. V., Inc., 468 
N.W.2d350, 371 (Neb. 1991), "related transactions," Local Oklahoma Bank v. The 
United States, 59 Fed. CI. 713, 722 (Fed. CI. 2004), and "directly related" or "related to 
the one transaction." Fleet Financial Group, Inc. v. Advanta Corp., 2003 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 127, *12, 15. Here, both the damages awarded to Flanders and to the Radmans 
arose under the Merger Agreement and out of the same facts and the same transaction. 
The damages relate directly to the same mutual duties and obligations owed by the parties 
to each other. More importantly, the Radmans breached the warranties effective on the 
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date of Closing. Thus, if the damage to Flanders had been applied a^> oi that date, the 
"mans would have been entitled to no pa\ ment at all The value of additional shortfall 
shares at issue was more lim,-- MILMJI D> me damage u> Handers. 
then/h ie the li i,!1 \ - it1 s Hilinf, nHVii Mm*" lin* award i prior to awarding nir\ 
prejudgment interest was correct and should he affirmed. 
1T The Radmans' "Atmosphere of Prejudice" Argument is Improper and 
Insufficiently Briefed. 
'I 'he Radmans assert that the trial court made "numerous erroneous rulings that 
resulted in a cumulative effc t of prejudice" to the Radmans r \ppclhnt Brief r 1 *] It 
identify the objectionable evidence, and identify where in the record the evidence was 
offered and reeeh ed <M rejected. See I JTAI IR. A.PP, P, 24(c) The appealing party must 
also present a coherent legal argui i lent as to > < • I i;; ' tl le e\ idei ltiai > i tilli lg v • as ii I ei roi , 
identifying the n lie of law and the standards that were allegedly breached by the trial : 
court. Finally, it is up to the appealing party to show how the errors prejudiced the 
outcome wi Hie case, as the Radi nans' owi I citation reveah ' . i firown v Richai 'ds, 840 
P '* . , \ pp 1992) It istead of satisfying these obligations the Radmans' 
brief on this argument contains a series of eonclusory assertions of systemic error that 
come perilously close to impugning tiic .,.„;,. cs oi uie inai ^airu i nis argument is 
which the appealing party m.j\ dump the burden oi argument and research.'" West 
Jordan i"ity \ \n)odman, _* (-5-1 li *-_v. , > u M i 
]•")! \: \ D o e 0 7 
Oddly, the Radmans appear to admit that none of the allegedly improper rulings 
were harmful. [Appellant Brief p. 44.] Therefore, even if the trial court committed error, 
any such error was harmless and does not warrant reversal. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. 
v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). The Radmans' only assertion of 
"harm" is that their attorneys had to do more work and were allegedly distracted from 
their trial preparations. Even assuming this to be true, the Radmans have not shown 
how the trial court's ultimate ruling in the case was affected by this "atmosphere of 
prejudice." This, of course, is what is meant by "harm." 
Finally, with respect to these alleged errors, Flanders notes that "trial courts are 
afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence" and those rulings 
will not be reversed "absent an abuse of discretion." Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, 
T[9, 121 P.3d 33 (quoting Vigil v. Division of Child & Family Servs., 2005 UT App 43, 
P8, 107 P.3d 716). With this standard in mind, Flanders briefly visits each of the asserted 
errors. 
With respect to Radmans' claim of late produced documents, the identity of the 
documents and where they were offered and received into evidence is not disclosed. 
Rather, the Radmans point to their pre-trial motion in limine, which was equally vague. 
With respect to the Radmans' claim of improperly admitted summaries, the trial 
court's rulings incorporate many subsidiary fact findings, which are not properly briefed, 
3
 This argument actually appears more akin to an "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
argument, which of course is a criminal law concept and not civil. 
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challenged, or marshaled by the Radmans. [R. 4942 pp. 202-212; R. 4942 pp. 218-228.] 
Moreover, the trial court heard extensive argument on this point and gave it all due 
consideratioi i, and clearly did i lot abt lse its disci etion. 
With respect to the Radmans'' claims of late designation of experts, they only cite 
to the record where Steven Clark testifies as to damages. They also fail to support 1 licit 
assertions that the deadlines were passed, fail to address tl ic it ial cour f s actual ruling .».^. 
With respecl u> the Radmans' claim of improper substitution t i <i part v. the 
Radmans' present no k al argument supportiiig their claiiH. . • •* Ji- iiu.\ >>pecnkaih 
addi ess tl le contei l .al c oi it f s i i llii ig 
With respect to the Radmans' claim of improper settlement discussion testimony; 
they have failed to identify the testimony or where in the record it occurred. Nor do they 
presei it ai i> legal argi i 
In short, this argument is insufficient!) briefed and should n u oe considered by 
the Court. It should be observed that the trial of this matter was extended over almost a 
\i<n , w if'lii .ij'iiiilii iiiil diin' l)i (\u i (1 lln ulaii s uiiiiii w I in li \ itkiin (• wiw hcijinl < ir ni (liese 
facts, any prejudice the Radmans complain about because of inadequate time to prepare 
was rejected by the trial court, due to the several opportunities the Radmans had to 
re v ie\ > ' e v idei ice pi oclii ice d after 1:1 le star t oi ti: ial 
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CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT 
VI. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that the Merger Agreement was Ambiguous. 
The basis of the Radmans' claim against Flanders is Section 9 of the Merger 
Agreement. In awarding judgment for the Radmans on this claim, the trial court found 
that this provision was ambiguous, and in fact, the trial court was even more specific, 
finding that it was the last phrase of that section - "with such Short Fall shares valued at 
the Market Price" - that was ambiguous. [R.4865 1]37.]4 Only after resolving this 
alleged ambiguity in the Radmans' favor was the trial court able to award judgment in the 
Radmans' favor. This ruling was in error, and is reviewed de novo by this Court. See 
Peterson v. The Sunrider Corporation, 2002 UT 43., 1J14, 48 P.3d 918. 
A contract is only ambiguous if "it is unclear, it omits terms, or 'the terms used to 
express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings.'" Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ^[15. A proffered alternate 
interpretation "must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used," and "to 
merit consideration as an interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition 
4
 It bears noting that the parties stipulated, and the trial court found, that the Merger 
Agreement "speaks for itself as to its terms and conditions." [R. 4862 [^23.] This, of 
course, is a finding that the contract is not ambiguous. See Clark v. Ducheneau, 26 Utah 
97, 104 (Utah 1903); Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162, 168 (Utah 1896); Groome v. Ogden 
City Corp., 10 Utah 54, 58 (Utah 1894). Despite this finding, the trial court proceeded to 
make the inconsistent finding that Section 9(a) of the Merger Agreement was ambiguous. 
[R.4865 1J37.] 
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'must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be 
the result of a forced or strained coi lstructioi 1 '" Id. at ^17 (emphasis added). 
The contract provisioi i at issi le (tl le ' "I s larket I 'rotectioi 1 Clai ise" ') reads as follow s: 
Pursuant to this Agreement., ihe GFI Shareholders are rceei\ ing ; 87.502 
shares of Flanders Capital Stock as set forth on I'.xhib.i "A" attached hereto. 
Since the 187,502 shares of Flanders Capital Stock are restricted shares, 
each share has a discounted market value of $8.00 per share, for an 
aggregate market price of $L500.016 (the "Market Price"). If at the time 
any of the GFI Shareholders sell any of the 187.502 shares of Flanders 
Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average trading 
price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital Slock as 
listed on the NASDAQ Stock I:\ehamje is below $8.U0 per shaa. Flanders 
shall deliver addition,;! restricted shaas o! Flanders Common Stock to such 
GFI Shareholders in order to maintain the Market Prire (the ''Short Fnli ), 
with such Short F'dl shares valued at ilk* Market Pru 
1 1 le Market I 'rotectioi i Clai ise is relativel} si IOI t and has no facial deficiencies. 
Therefore, for the trial uuir? u= have properh held that the Market Piokaion Clause was 
ambiguous, it would nave », .»J>C Km;;*; ;iu«; u^re were two or more ph....s. le 
clearly expressed their mfu<. me language ibclf onl\ allows one, no! two, plausible 
meanings. Because of this met, the mai court erred. 
the Market Price" was ambieuous [R.4865 1[37], thai \> ch;u:ij inaccurate. That phrase is 
quite clear that the additional ->l lares issued will be \ aiu^d at *m amount represented by 
is ambiguous. [R. 4865; R. 4939 pp. 27-28.] Ilowever, that term is defined earlier in the 
provision with the phrase "each share has a discounted market value of $8.00 per share, 
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for an aggregate market price of $1,500,016 (the 'Market Price')." Therefore, only two 
definitions for the term "Market Price" are even possible — $8 or $1,500,016. 
A. Flanders's Interpretation of "Market Price" is Plausible. 
Flanders' interpretation of the term "Market Price" as meaning $8 is the only 
interpretation that makes sense in the context of the Merger Agreement as a whole. 
Under Flanders' interpretation, each share sold by the Radmans could be treated 
separately, and if that share were sold for less than $8, that Radman would be entitled to 
an additional fraction of a share (up to a maximum of one additional share) equal to the 
shortfall on the sale of that share divided by the "Market Price" of $8. This interpretation 
is the only reasonable interpretation allowed by the actual words, and causes the 
provision to function even if only some shares were sold, as the provision contemplated. 
See Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc9 1999 UT 89, ^|14, 987 P.2d 48 ("a court must attempt to 
construe the contract so as to 'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.'") 
B. The Radmans' Interpretation of "Market Price" is Not Plausible. 
The Radmans' interpretation, on the other hand, is that "Market Price" means 
$1,500,016, which renders the last phrase nonsensical and provides no guidance on how 
many shares are to be issued. Therefore, the Radmans argue, the provision is ambiguous, 
and should be interpreted as an absolute guarantee of receiving $1.5 million and that 
Flanders was obligated to issue an amount of additional shares equal to the shortfall 
amount divided by the trading price of Flanders stock on the date the shortfall shares 
were issued. 
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Defining "Market Price" as $1,500,016 leads to absurd results. Giving meaning to 
all of the words in the provision, as tin: Courl must, the Radman^ interpretation would 
produce the following result: if a Radi i lai 1 sold 01 ic si lare at $ I, I 'lai idei s vv 01 ild issi ne an 
amount of shares equnl lo the $4 shortfall divided by the "Market Price" of $l,500,01o -
or .0000027 shares. In fact, under this mierpretation, if nil .-~ihc >haies were entirely 
worthless, the Radmans would get one a^n-onal share to split between tliun • * ,.500,01/6 
reasonable in light of the language used," and if fact only serves to create an ambiguity. 
As a matter of contract interpretation, courts rightly re I use u» interpret ambiguity into a 
c : • ' . 
thereby add a term to the parties agreement that they did not include themselves." R&R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Industries,, J>u . 0V- P.M 1068 lO^O (Utah 1997). 
Lacking at ly plait isible c oi it! at } : !L:U \ureei nei it., tl lere cai l 
be no ambiguity in the Merger Agreement, but onl a generalized dissatisfaction on the 
part of the Radmans. However, dissatisfaction with an agreed-upon deal is not grounds 
for breach of contract, as I Jtali courts "\ \ ill i lot i i lak 2 a better ::oi iti act fc 1 tl le parties tl lai 1 
they have made for themselves." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, 
^|19, 52 P.3d 1179. Since the Market Protection Clause has only one plausible 
interpretation, t...
 ;, au ,.-:^  a ambigm u - ., . 
favo? ' *!"-- Radmans < *:• a daim for breach of contract should be reversed. 
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VII. The Trial Court Improperly Ignored the Language of the Contract in its 
Interpretation. 
Even if the Market Protection Clause were ambiguous, the trial court erred in the 
way it interpreted the provision. Although a trial court's interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, the question of whether a court 
properly applied a rule of uniform application, such as a rule of contract interpretation, is 
a legal question reviewed for correctness. See Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58,1fl7, 7 P.3d 783. The trial court held that 
the term "Market Price" in the provision meant $1,500,016, that this meant "that the short 
fall shares would be valued based on the Market Price of $1.5 million", and that the 
computation of how many shares would be issued would "be accomplished by dividing 
the Short Fall amount by the trading price of Flanders shares on the date the Short Fall 
shares were issued." [R. 4867-68.] This interpretation completely rewrites the language 
of the provision, adding terms and computations that cannot be found in the contract, 
such as the trading price on the date of issuance of shares.5 Moreover, if the parties had 
intended "Market Price" to mean the "trading price" the clearly could have said so, as is 
evident from the fact that they used that term in the very provision at issue. By giving the 
provision a meaning that cannot be harmonized with the words themselves, the trial court 
5
 In fact, this interpretation leaves open further ambiguities. Does trading price mean 
average trading price for the day, opening price, closing price, the daily high price, the 
daily low? More importantly, any additional shortfall shares would also be restricted, 
meaning that their value could also change dramatically before the Radmans would ever 
have been able to sell them, rendering this computation largely pointless. 
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overs!cnned its role. See WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^|25, 54 
P.3d 1 1 '.W ("It is the general rule that if ai i agreement is ambiguous because ofa lack of 
clarity in the meaning ol pan.* ;<iai iuinv a ; J - . V L . ,, pan.-, c\ idence as to w hat tl ic 
•
 :
- ••-•>** *! -.viiii reaped ,v. iiu^seju'i_n> ' • •*••»-.: added)). Instead, the trial court 
interpreted the alleged!) anil \I:IJOUS lei in ''Market Price" and thei i proceeded to rewrite 
the Market Protection. C!nu^- s his was improper, and the trial court' s ii iterpretation 
si 101 ii :! be reversed .. . .-., ... ..• . . . 
VIII. The Trial Court Improperly Ruled That the Radmans Were Co-Prevailing 
Parties 
III IN- .- : M • . . i K i i n - n i - .--• • •• M J i i i i v S U ' i l 1 0 
the trial coun that Jl ^ ould find thai bolh parties pievailed based on language from R.7'. 
Nielsun Co. v Cook. 2002 UT1L «!25. 40 P 3d 1110. and C- ^on Disinn. i o \ Salt 
LUKL l>u winy ( w . L i .... • ~: : . pp 2 J \ * 
Prior to the trial coi ill's decision on this matter, this court issued an opinion cleai ly 
stating that "[t]here can be only one prevailing parh in ;m\ litigation." Cache County v. 
Bens, 2ll(h 111 App MM, 1|M, 128 J"2kl b i, Although Flaiitlcn ; counsel brought this 
M illi'int it »i, to iililii In mi Hil imrfs (illention pnoi 1M iiiid at the hearing on this matter, the trial 
court nevertheless held that both parties prevailed, [R 4949 pp, 29-30; R. 4891 -92.] 
Baseu *ti. (in . ^ K,ui[ . M, 1V;;,. ii, c ,,-, ;u x <)un, *, that ruling was in error. 
instead, (lit" (ni,i! toml should h.i> c ruled thai Inlanders was the prevailing party and 
awarded Flanders its attornc} lees, The Merger Agreement <;• this ^ K maids attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party in am litigation, VMUHL. ina* pjn ..^ e\enl ef'aiw action at 
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law or suit in equity in relation to this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid by 
the other party a reasonable sum for the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by such 
prevailing party." [Ex. P-l, Section 12(m).] This provision allows Flanders to recover its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in successfully pursuing the breach of 
warranty claims. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and approved the "flexible and reasoned" 
approach first used by the Utah Court of Appeals in Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, [^26, 94 P.3d 270. This approach begins (and possibly 
ends) with the "net judgment rule," pursuant to which the party awarded the most 
damages is the prevailing party. See Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 557. If the "net 
judgment rule" provides a sensible result, the Court need not look any further. However, 
if the Court is uncertain of the "net judgment rule" result, it can consider other "common 
sense perspectives" that the Court finds applicable to the case at issue. See Whipple, 
2004 UT 47 at ^|26. Different courts have proposed different tests to apply in determining 
who is the prevailing party. The Utah Court of Appeals has compiled the following non-
exclusive list of considerations for the trial court in making that determination: 
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims, etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative 
to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered 
as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in 
connection with the various claims. 
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Carlson, 2004 (J J" A I T 2.21 A ^,J7. Ihi^ list can be summarized by asking which party 
prevailed on the predominating claim. 
Application of tl le "f lexible ai id reasoned" approacl i it i this case results ii 11 'landers 
shows that Flanders received an award of $1 162 million compared to the Radmans' 
award of $547,904.50. and thus H a n d u s -s Uie prevailing party, [R , 4893.] 
II tl le Cc i ii t does elect to - *• : • • - - sis tl ie most »-
perspective to apply in this case is which pan^ prevailed on the predominant claim. See 
Chang v. Soldier Summit Dew. 2003 I T \ r r 115 *?1 R? P ^d °0^ (holding that 
""a III I in i i r i l i e a t I
 ; ;•: 
issues and most expensive aspects' of this case**). Here, while the Radmans were 
awarded some additional compensation undei the Merger \L?reement. Flanders was given 
its emiK . : ; . . . .
 t . . •• .. . [-.,. ! ,. w - equipmei it, am :)i n itii lg to i leai ly 1:1 ic: eritii e 
contr. ^u , ui the acquisition. |_iv. *+O?J.J Moreover, while Flanders had already 
complied in large part with its contractual obligations, the Radmans completely breached 
the Merger Agreement from the ver\ .... , ,;„ ^ *..a.> signeu. frustrating all of I Zanders' 
coi itracti ia.1 expectations Additionally, the breach of warranty claim was the most 
complex factually and legally, and absorbed the vast majority of the time spent by the 
lawyers, the parties, and this Coiii t 1 1 ie trial til i ie devoted to tl ie breach of warranty 
claii :t is \ vras i i.eai ly 80S c » of tl i * total trial t ••• -\\ ':• •• ->- *•• - ; . v ;ed largely 
on Flanders'breach of warranty claims j il^^ N S J i/ieaiK the bread) of warrant} 
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claims predominated in this litigation, and Flanders was the prevailing party with respect 
to those claims. 
The "net judgment rule" leads to the appropriate result that Flanders is the 
prevailing party. Even under an alternative approach analyzing which party prevailed on 
the predominant claim, Flanders is also the prevailing party. If there can only be one 
prevailing party, it must be Flanders. Accordingly, the trial court's decision that the 
Radmans were also a prevailing party should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because none of the arguments advanced by the Radmans are sufficient to show 
that any error even occurred, much less an error than in any way affected the outcome of 
the case, the trial court should be affirmed with respect to the judgment rendered in favor 
of Flanders. However, because the trial court erred in critical ways in its interpretation of 
the Market Protection Clause, the judgment rendered in favor of the Radmans on their 
claims should be reversed, and the trial court's determination that the Radmans were co-
prevailing parties should be reversed. 
DATED this [^h day of February, 2007. 
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